_Human_ 10. 2021 In this article we introduce a possible way to interpret the possibility and necessity notions developed within the Megaric-Stoic logic as alethic modal operators. Megaric-Stoic semantics will be introduced as metaphysical background for necessity and possibility definitions and arguments will be offered in order to give up the prevailing interpretations which include ad hoc variables. After proposing the survey of diodoric definitions from relational modal semantics, a series […]

In Alex Dubilet & Kirill Chepurin (eds.), _Nothing Absolute: German Idealism and the Question of Political Theology_. New York, NY, USA: pp. 240-255. 2021 Dubilet’s contribution turns to Marx’s “On the Jewish Question” in order to diagnose the collusive interplay between mediation and sovereignty as modes of transcendence that, together, prevent real immanence from irrupting. It does so by recovering the logic of “the general secular contradiction”—the division between the […]

This paper investigates the nature of reality by looking at the philosophical debate between realism and idealism and at scientific investigations in quantum physics and at recent studies of animal senses, neurology and cognitive psychology. The concept of perceptual relativity is examined and this involves looking at sense perception in other animals and various examples of perceptual relativity in science. It will be concluded that the universe is observer dependent and that there is no […]

_Pacific Philosophical Quarterly_:1-22. forthcoming I raise two objections against Christian List and Peter Menzies' influential account of high-level causation. Improving upon some of Stephen Yablo's earlier work, I develop an alternative theory which evades both objections. The discussion calls into question List and Menzies' main contention, namely, that the exclusion principle, applied to difference-making, is false.(direct link)

_Philosophical Topics_. forthcoming Can agents rationally inquire into things that they know? On my view, the answer is yes. Call this view the Compatibility Thesis. One challenge to this thesis is to explain why assertions like “I know that p, but I’m wondering whether p” sound odd, if not Moore-Paradoxical. In response to this challenge, I argue that we can reject one or both premises that give rise to it. First, we can deny that inquiry requires interrogative attitudes. Second, we can […]